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CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT 
PRACTICE: BRIDGING THE GAP 
BETWEEN LEGAL REASONING AND 
COMMERCIAL EXPECTATION,  
by Catherine Mitchell1
STEVEN N. MANDZIUK*
“A CONTRACT IS A PROMISE THAT THE LAW WILL ENFORCE.”2 Behind this 
aphorism lies the idea that a well-functioning contract law system will protect the 
expectations of contracting parties, ensure the advancement of economic interests, 
and, as a result, improve society. But, what goes into the contract and the promise? 
How do law and expectations interact when issues of contract interpretation and 
enforcement must be decided? Practitioners involved in day-to-day commercial 
practice will agree that there are often differences between the law applicable to a 
contract and the actual conduct and expectations of contracting parties.
Catherine Mitchell’s well-researched book Contract Law and Contract Practice: 
Bridging the Gap between Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectation considers 
the friction between the classical legal approach to contract interpretation and 
1. (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2013) 288 pages.
2. Among the prominent sources for this maxim, see e.g. Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts 
(New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co, 1924) vol 1 (“A contract is a promise, or set of promises, 
to which the law attaches legal obligation” at 1).
*  QC. General Counsel, Finning (Canada)—a division of Finning International Inc—
Edmonton, Alberta.
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an approach that emphasizes the contextual facts that surround and imbue the 
contractual relationship. Mitchell argues for an adaptable approach, founded in 
relational contract law, that leads to more just and complete results and that, 
in doing so, upholds and enhances the relevance of commercial contract law to 
business.3 This method requires the courts to refrain from beginning their analysis 
“with a particular conception of the law of contract … [that] largely determines 
their conclusions”4 and to consider the norms of the contractual relationship:
The point of relational contract law is to achieve some overall sense of how the parties 
understood their agreement. … What relational theory demands is sensitivity to a 
range of contracting circumstances and a denial of the traditional binary lines along 
which debates are often drawn. Pragmatism, context and flexibility are the hallmarks 
of a relational approach to contractual agreements.5
Mitchell describes three avenues of legal reasoning in contract interpreta-
tion. The formalistic, classical method is text-based—“a literal or plain meaning 
method to understanding the words of the contract,” which are assumed to form 
a relatively complete and “supreme statement of the parties’ obligations.”6 This 
method is contrasted with a neoclassical approach, which “would differ in that it 
might permit enquiries outside the documents to decide what the parties meant 
by the words they have used, although this might achieve the same result as [the] 
literal method.”7 Finally, there is a fully contextual approach, which “would not 
3. Supra note 1 (“There will be costs involved in developing a relational contract law, but the 
institutional costs in not developing it, particularly in terms of our confidence in contract 
law’s capacity to facilitate commercial dealing and commercial expectations in all their forms, 
are likely to be greater” at 266).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid at 265-66 [emphasis in the original].
6. Ibid at 10. Classicism has a cousin in literary theory. The “New Criticism” posits that the 
text alone is the proper focus of literary analysis. Other information related to the text—its 
epoch, the author’s biography and intention, genre—is irrelevant. For a more in-depth 
description of the New Criticism, see MH Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 7th ed 
(Boston, Mass: Heinle & Heinle, 1999) at 180 (describing the New Criticism as “insisting 
that the proper concern of literary criticism is not with the external circumstances or 
effects or historical position of a work, but with a detailed consideration of the work itself 
as an independent entity”). See also WK Wimsatt, Jr & MC Beardsley, “The Intentional 
Fallacy” (1946) 54:3 Sewanee Rev 468 (claiming “the design or intention of the author is 
neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary 
art… ” at 468).
7. Ibid at 10-11.
MANDZIUK, CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT PRACTICE 662
begin the interpretative task by attention to the documents at all, but would 
examine other aspects of the contractual relationship.”8
Examples of these contrasting approaches are found throughout case law 
and in commercial dealings, for example when: (i) legal principles (e.g., four 
corners of the contract and entire agreement clauses) clash with equitable 
principles (e.g., promissory estoppel, implied terms, rectification, restitution, 
laches, and acquiescence);9 (ii) one party who “dots all I’s and crosses all T’s” is at 
odds with another who “begs forgiveness”; (iii) the objective stands against the 
subjective;10 (iv) one party wants to fit the facts to the rules instead of finding 
intent through the facts and enforcing it; and (v) the real social world and trust 
oppose the artifice of the legal world and legislation.11 Without oversimplifying 
or overstating the matter, these examples are behavioural representations of 
philosophical poles within the law. The courts, the jurisprudence, and legislative 
reactions to commercial issues cannot help but reflect these tensions, since these 
tensions play out in the human psyche and in human relationships. The struggle 
between self-interest and cooperation, or to use Duncan Kennedy’s terminology, 
individualism and altruism,12 is fundamental to much legal theorizing.
Mitchell does not, however, seek to frame the contending approaches 
to contract law as a set of pure dichotomies that can be broadly labelled as 
8. Ibid at 11 (adding, “The use of contextualism in such a method may reveal that the written 
documents were not that important to the parties at all and may be manifestly unreliable as a 
statement of their understandings about their agreement”).
9. See also ibid at 15 (“it is clear to anyone with more than a cursory appreciation of the 
law that the rigid classical model of contract law has been undermined in many different 
ways and that contract law is not completely isolated from commercial expectations 
and practices”).
10. See generally Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1974) (noting, “Holmes and his successors substituted an ‘objectivist’ approach to the theory 
of contract for the ‘subjectivist’ approach…” at 35 [citation omitted]).
11. See Mitchell, supra note 1 at 256 (arguing “[t]he disposition of the Total case appears 
precisely to rely upon a juxtaposition between the social and the legal; between the real world 
and the legal world; between ‘documents’ and ‘understandings’, completely overlooking 
that there was a way to make these two ‘worlds’ consistent”). See Total Gas Marketing v Arco 
British, [1998] UKHL 22.
12. “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89:8 Harv L Rev 1685 at 1685. 
Kennedy states:
there are two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with substantive issues, which I will call 
individualism and altruism. There are also two opposed modes for dealing with questions of 
the form in which legal solutions to the substantive problems should be cast. One formal mode 
favors the use of clearly defined, highly administrable, general rules; the other supports the 
use of equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with relatively little precedential value.
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contextualist or formalist. She does not start with the assumption that there is 
in fact a misalignment between law and commercial expectations. But she does 
end with that conclusion. To reach this conclusion of misalignment, Mitchell 
first examines the nature of commercial expectations, noting that there is no 
single denotative or connotative meaning to that term. What does commercial 
expectation mean and how does it differ from existing contract law concepts? How 
does an expectation become relevant in general terms as opposed to transaction- 
or dispute-specific evidentiary terms? Any attempt to assign meaning must take 
into account commercial values, and these values are themselves multilayered13 
expectations capable of being “derived from different starting points.”14
While values inform any attempt to define commercial expectations, 
other factors that can underlie expectations must also be considered, including 
commercial practice standards—“recurring pattern[s] of behaviour”15 between 
parties or within a particular industrial context. In fact, identifiable standards 
“may mean more to the parties than the finer points of classical contractual 
theory”16 and, therefore, may reduce the impact of classical legal reasoning on 
commercial arrangements. Business cooperation is another factor: the relation-
ship between the values immanent in commercial law17 and the “reluctance of the 
law to embrace an overriding concept of good faith.”18 Commercial expectation is 
also shaped by the way that changing economics have led to the use of networks, 
master or umbrella agreements, and letters of intent. In short, commercial 
expectation is not a static concept. Taking those definitional challenges into 
13. Mitchell, supra note 1 at 28 [citation omitted] (“Broadly speaking, an expectation ... might 
be grounded in one’s experience (empirically based), … grounded on some normative 
commitment thought valuable, or … derived from or protected by some social institution”).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid at 30.
16. Ibid at 33, citing JH Baker, “From Sanctity of Contract to Reasonable Expectation” (1979) 
32:1 Current Leg Probs 17 at 23.
17. See generally ibid at 39, n 29, citing Roy Goode, “The Codification of Commercial Law” 
(1988) 14:3 Monash UL Rev 135 at 148 (arguing there are “eight principles which together 
make up the philosophy of commercial law”: party autonomy, predictability, flexibility, good 
faith, the encouragement of self-help, the facilitation of security interests, the protection of 
vested interests, and the protection of innocent third parties).
18. Mitchell, supra note 1 at 42. Mitchell’s book was published prior to the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s ruling in Bhasin v Hrynew, which recognized a general duty of honest performance. 
See Bhasin v Hyrnew, 2014 SCC 71 at para 92, Cromwell J (CanLII) (concluding “that at 
this point in the development of Canadian common law, adding a general duty of honest 
contractual performance is an appropriate incremental step, recognizing that the implications 
of the broader, organizing principle of good faith must be allowed to evolve according to the 
same incremental judicial approach”).
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consideration, Mitchell concludes that there is, at first blush, an argument that 
contract law should, in some way, “consider its degree of alignment with the 
norms, practices and implicit dimensions that lie outside the express contract 
terms and also outside the rules and principles of contract law.”19
Is there in fact a misalignment between contract law and what the business 
community does and expects? In addressing this question, Mitchell discusses a 
number of empirical studies that support this conclusion. These studies show 
that parties to contracts place more value on “normative and institutional 
structures, such as trust, reasonable expectations and informal sanctioning” than 
on the written word when entering into contracts and assessing the performance 
of obligations by one another.20 Conversely, Mitchell notes that other empirical 
studies have been used to support the opposite position.21 While there is acknowl-
edgement that “all contracts are socially embedded,” the degree of importance of 
actual conduct when developing and applying rules of contract law is debatable.22 
Mitchell concludes that “[d]isagreement centres over whether norms consti-
tuting the ‘real deal’ exist, how they are to be identified, what justifies their 
use and the circumstances in which legal recognition and enforcement of these 
is appropriate.”23
With appropriate caution, empirical studies can be used as sources of 
information about expectations and practices and to see “whether it is possible 
to make any generalisations from the findings concerning the design of contract 
law rules and legal reform.”24 Trade associations that develop standard forms 
and processes are arguably more influential than the applicable law in defining 
how business is done, particularly where commerce is impaired or hindered by 
“competing and inconsistent ‘customary’ understandings… .”25 Some critics 
19. Ibid at 63.
20. Ibid at 1. Mitchell notes that empirical studies of contracting behaviour have shown that the 
acceptance of norms in the commercial context is based more on relationship and industry 
than on legal principles (ibid at 64-68).
21. Ibid at 65 (“empirical studies have been used to support two opposing lines of argument 
concerning the design of contract law rules”).
22. Ibid at 2.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid at 68.
25. Ibid at 80 (“Here it is traders themselves, rather than lawyers, that have created bodies of 
functioning rules in order to facilitate trade and resolve problems of co-ordination, security 
and certainty”). Mitchell cites Art 9 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (ibid at 76-77, n 47). One can also consider the international 
derivative and swap master agreement model for use in the over-the-counter derivatives 
industry. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 2002 Master Agreement.
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dispute the very existence of trade customs and oppose the consideration of 
relational details in the legal reasoning process, citing a lack of normative univer-
sality, a lessening of trust between contracting parties, and the cost of enforcement 
where disputes arise over what is or is not a properly normative consideration.26
Mitchell rejects the idea that relational considerations inherently dilute the 
leadership role that the law can take: “The essence of legality is not just in imposing 
sanctions but in channelling behaviour.”27 In fact, the law already engages in an 
internal dialogue between the relational and the classical in those instances where 
it takes a standards-based approach to recognize and protect expectations of 
contracting parties under the guise of equity-based principles. So, classic contract 
law may already possess the internal flexibility to “stay connected to commercial 
expectations.”28 Whether this is so is a question of the degree to which the law 
can examine trade practices, implied terms, and understandings to achieve a just 
result that accords with contracting parties’ expectations: “For every commercial 
contract case that displays some appreciation of the informal norms and expecta-
tions that surround the legal agreement, there are counter-examples that display 
a more attenuated commitment to recognising and enforcing the ‘real deal.’”29
Mitchell outlines some examples in which the courts have considered 
evidence of parties’ expectations that are external to the written contract terms.30 
The justifications for a strict application of written terms (e.g., evidentiary, 
imposition of external order, hindering effect on uncertain claims regarding 
obligations and performance) are contrasted with instances where courts make 
decisions that appear to contradict the written word, “motivated seemingly by 
equitable considerations of fairness and balance.”31 Mitchell concludes that the 
law’s requirement for certainty is not always commensurate with the parties’ 
relationship, the subject matter of the contract, external requirements, and 
other factors, so flexible terms may be written in an express fashion (e.g., the 
requirement to behave “reasonably”) to achieve an outcome that may not be 
26. Mitchell, supra note 1 at 82, nn 76-77, citing Lisa Bernstein, “Merchant Law in a Merchant 
Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms” (1996) 144:5 U 
Pa L Rev 1765 at 1768; Lisa Bernstein, “The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s 
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study” (1999) 66:3 U Chicago L Rev 710.
27. Ibid at 86.
28. Ibid at 100.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid at 100-137 (observing that “the interpretation of the contract within the law does not 
involve interpreting the contractual agreement, but the contract text” at 104 [emphasis in 
the original]).
31. Ibid at 107.
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known or capable of clear definition.32 In some cases, themes emerge in the case 
law whereby the legal framework adapts to contractual performance, rather than 
the other way around.
Mitchell also contemplates whether or not there is support for narrowing the 
gap between law and commercial expectation based on efficiency or incentiviza-
tion and rights-based or promissory contract law theories, “the two dominant 
accounts of the underpinning justification for contract law.”33 Mitchell does not 
express a preference for one theory or the other per se; while either approach can 
arguably be applied to close the gap between law and commercial expectation, 
neither can be conclusively favoured. Given the importance of actions and 
performance to commercial parties,34 Mitchell concludes that relational theory 
might be the best approach. Promissory theory has its weaknesses, but it does 
have the larger goal in mind that what the parties understood about their deal 
is what should be enforced. Efficiency theory has its problems as well, including 
enforcement costs, the challenge of determining terms when attempting to take 
account of the parties’ expectations, and the possibility of excessive reliance on 
wealth maximization at the expense of contextual factors.
The conclusion is that in those instances where the law subsumes the 
“individualism and dynamism” of relational contract theory, the arguments 
against contextualization based on unpredictability, particularization, and discord 
with perceived values of commercial law melt away.35 The contextual approach 
itself addresses those problems. Mitchell argues,
The main benefit of a relational and commercial-expectations approach to contract 
law is that it seeks to draw out and apply the internally generated norms of the 
business relationship to questions concerning the scope of contractual obligations 
or dispute resolution. This is preferable to an approach which champions a set 
of external standards whose assumptions and expectations are a poor fit with the 
actual practice that the law is supposed to regulate and facilitate. In this respect the 
contextual factors that may be examined as part of the legal reasoning process will be 
32. Ibid at 136-37.
33. Ibid at 138-39.
34. Ibid at 169 (adding that “[f ]or these contractors it is performance of obligations that is 
sought and that is an indicator of reputation, not ability to satisfy court judgments through 
the payment of damages”).
35. Ibid at 264.
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familiar to the parties because they constitute and inform the environment in which 
they make and perform their agreement.36
The relational approach stabilizes the legal system when the courts grant 
“remedies for breach that mesh consistently with the context of the parties’ 
agreement, its aims and purposes.”37 While there are different ways to establish 
relational theory within legal reasoning, Mitchell concludes that this is not 
new ground in contract law and that placing more emphasis on it “may offer 
better support for the parties’ commercial expectations than alternatives.”38 But 
the courts generally apply a contract law that is “adversarial and competitive 
… evinc[ing] a preference for the contract text as the main source of evidence 
about obligations.”39
Mitchell examines how relational theory “might yield a theory about 
legal reasoning in commercial contracts that is more sensitive to commercial 
expectations”40 and “stresses the importance of the social embeddedness, or social 
context, of all exchange behavior.”41 As she succinctly puts it,
A better supporting theory for the commercial-expectations approach would be one 
that places central importance on the idea that commercial contract law should, 
where appropriate, track the norms and behaviours of actual contracting parties. 
Such an alternative is presented by the relational theory of contract.42
This is Mitchell’s preferred approach.43 Contextualizing builds a platform 
that makes legal reasoning more attentive to commercial reality and takes it away 
36. Ibid. Mitchell adds,
Such a law can be castigated as unpredictable and ad hoc, but to the extent that its hallmark 
is close attention to context, its method is entirely predictable and from this starting point 
outcomes may be broadly predictable also. The indeterminacy simply reflects the complexity 
of the phenomenon that is subject to the legal controls (ibid).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. Mitchell adds, “The law already demonstrates considerable capacity to take an 
individualistic approach to contract dispute resolution. Commercial courts pride themselves, 
rightly or wrongly, on being able to reach outcomes which either reflect specific commercial 
practices, or are motivated by business common sense” (ibid).
39. Ibid at 265.
40. Ibid at 171.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Mitchell extensively discusses the work of Ian Macneil in chapter six. Macneil’s relational 
theory is “rooted in an understanding of contract as essentially a social as opposed to an 
exclusively legal or economic phenomenon, although ‘social’ naturally incorporates these two 
perspectives” (ibid at 172). See e.g. Ian Macneil, The Relational Theory of Contract: Selected 
Works of Ian Macneil, ed by David Campbell (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001).
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from classical law’s characterization of contracting parties as “atomistic, rational, 
self-interested individuals of roughly equal bargaining power who agree on 
contract terms and then commence performance.”44 Relational theory analyzes 
contracts within “the wider span of social relationships in which transactions 
take place.”45 In the absence of this broader context, a strictly legal focus on the 
relationship will not lead to the just and complete result between parties.
The relational approach is not without its challenges. But it starts with 
context, rather than express terms. Moreover, there are some universal norms, 
such as reciprocity.46 Mitchell concludes that
the central insights of relational theory—that context is important, that 
indeterminacy in contract circumstances is rife, that classical law is manifestly 
unsuitable for some forms of contractual relationship—support the idea that 
commercial contract law should reflect commercial practice, since the theory 
demands that a range of considerations, not any single value, be factored into any 
analysis of exchange relationships.47
The tendency within the law to emphasize formalism and objectivity can be 
an impediment; this may be a result of the rules having their origin in litigation. 
Mitchell queries “whether an adversarial dispute resolution process, beset by 
criticism relating to time and costs, can ever be a suitable forum within which 
to discover, let alone implement, the parties’ (non-contractual) commercial 
expectations.”48 If relational factors are assumed ab initio to be external to the 
contract, how do those factors penetrate the barrier and become evidence to be 
considered equally with the written document (or perhaps as even more important 
than it)? In Mitchell’s view, while there may be a preference among litigants for 
formalism, the law needs to be “a facilitative institution, [and] any perceived 
incapacity on the part of the law to become more relationally constituted should 
be a cause for concern.”49 In her view, there is reason to be optimistic. As she notes,
While the limitations and context of the litigation process provide some barriers to 
the development of a contract law more aligned with commercial expectations, this 
does at least suggest that it is litigation processes and case management that prevents 
development of a relationally constituted contract law, not anything internally 
related to the law of contract itself.50
44. Mitchell, supra note 1 at 173.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid at 193.
47. Ibid at 199.
48. Ibid at 235.
49. Ibid at 236.
50. Ibid.
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Catherine Mitchell’s stated goal in Contract Law and Contract Practice: 
Bridging the Gap between Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectation is to 
“fill a gap in contract law scholarship and to contribute to understanding the 
relationship between contract law and commercial contracting practice … that 
appears inadequately covered in the literature concerning the existence of the 
‘real deal’ and its effect in the ‘non-use’ of contract law.”51 It must be noted 
that the book has a British focus, but this does not diminish its utility in the 
Canadian setting. I recommend the book to anyone who negotiates, administers, 
or litigates commercial contracts from formation to performance to termination. 
Commercial lawyers will find that this book illuminates many of the inchoate, 
intuitive conclusions that they have reached after time spent in day-to-day 
practice. All of us should endeavor to think broadly about the nature and purpose 
of commercial contracts and their components. Mitchell’s book forms a welcome 
addition to the canon.
51. Ibid at 7.
